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Summary 
In his 2012–13 budget, Governor Brown proposed a new system for allocating state revenue among 
California school districts. In May the governor revised his proposal. Using the PPIC School Finance Model 
(available at www.ppic.org/main/dataSet.asp?i=1229), in this update we show how these proposals would 
guide the allocation of additional revenue among school districts. Under both proposals, school districts 
educating high percentages of disadvantaged students would receive the largest revenue gains. Compared 
to the original proposal, the revised proposal provides less funding for disadvantaged students and 
substantially reduces differences in gains among districts. 
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Governor Brown’s May Proposal 
In his 2012–13 budget released in January, Governor Brown proposed a new system for allocating state 
revenue among California school districts, a proposal we analyzed in a previous paper.1 In the May revision 
of his budget, the governor also revised his school finance proposal. This paper updates our previous 
analysis to account for those changes. 
The governor proposes to replace the current system with a weighted pupil funding (WPF) formula. The 
revised proposal addresses many important questions, including the transition from the current system to 
the new system and accompanying modifications to the state’s accountability system. As in our previous 
analysis, however, our focus is how the WPF formula would change the allocation of revenue among school 
districts. In this regard, the revised proposal makes three important changes: 
 Weights for disadvantaged students. With a weighted pupil funding formula, the revenue a district 
receives equals a base rate multiplied by a sum of student weights in the district. In the governor’s 
original proposal, students who are disadvantaged (English learners or students who qualify for free 
or reduced-price lunch) had a weight of 1.37. This weight increases as disadvantaged students 
become more than 50 percent of students, the concentration factor. All other students had a weight 
of 1.0. The revised proposal reduces the weight for disadvantaged students from 1.37 to 1.20. The 
concentration factor remains, but with the lower weight. 
 Weights for grade level. In the original proposal, students who were not disadvantaged had a 
weight of 1.0, regardless of their grade. Under the revised proposal, student weights vary by grade 
level. Using students in grade 4 though 6 as the base with a weight of 1.0, the grade-level weights are 
as follows: 
Grade level Student weight 
K–3 1.1078 
4–6 1.0000 
7–8 1.0298 
9–12 1.1931 
 
In determining weights for a district, the formula multiplies grade-level weights by weights for 
disadvantage. For example, a disadvantaged student in grade 3 has a weight of 1.33 (1.11 x 1.20). 
 Add-ons for Targeted Instructional Improvement Block Grant (TIIBG) and Home-to-School 
Transportation (HST). The original proposal consolidated these two programs into the WPF 
formula. The revised proposal eliminates the two programs but adds the revenue that districts now 
receive in the two programs to the revenue from the WPF formula. A district would receive its 
formula revenue, plus the revenue it now receives from those two programs. In 2010–11, these 
programs totaled $1.3 billion, 4 percent of all state K–12 funding. 
  
                                                          
 
1 Heather Rose, Jon Sonstelie, and Margaret Weston, “Funding Formulas III: An Analysis of Governor Brown’s Weighted Pupil Funding 
Formula” (Public Policy Institute of California, 2012). 
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Modeling the Proposal 
The original proposal envisioned phasing in the new formula over six years, with the base rate rising to 
$6,990 per student when the formula is fully implemented in 2017–18. We simulated the fully implemented 
formula and compared the revenue that districts would receive with what they actually received in 2010–11.  
To simulate the revised proposal, we used the same demographic and economic assumptions as in the 
original simulations but applied the new weights for grade level and disadvantage, as well as included the 
TIIBG and HST add-ons. We chose the base rate to make our simulations with this revised proposal 
comparable to the original simulation. In particular, we chose the base rate so that the aggregate revenue 
received by all districts in the new simulation equals the aggregate revenue they received in the original 
simulation.2 
Table 1 shows the average gains districts would receive under the new proposal relative to their current 
funding. For the sake of comparison, it also shows the gains districts would have received under the original 
proposal. Districts are categorized by type and by percentage of students who are disadvantaged. For each 
category, the table reports the average gain in revenue per pupil in moving from the allocation in 2010–11 to 
the allocation districts received in our simulation. The first column for each district type is the average gain 
under the original proposal. The second column is the average gain under the revised proposal. For example, 
unified districts with fewer than 20 percent of students who are disadvantaged would gain an average of 
$1,229 per student under the original proposal. Those districts would gain an average of $1,881 under the 
revised proposal. 
TABLE 1  
Average change in funding from 2010–11 to revenue in weighted pupil funding simulation, 
dollars per student 
 
Disadvantaged 
students (%) 
Unified districts Elementary districts High school districts 
Original 
proposal 
Revised 
proposal 
Original 
proposal 
Revised 
proposal 
Original 
proposal 
Revised 
proposal 
0–20 $1,229 $1,881 $1,241 $1,585 $631 $1,516 
20–40   1,576   2,034   1,956   2,083   621   1,717 
40–60   2,073   2,278   2,199   2,158   1,134   2,168 
60–80   3,124   2,996   3,542   2,946   1,998   2,457 
80–100   3,963   3,520   5,287   3,923   3,369   3,391 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on PPIC School Finance Model. 
Compared to the actual revenue that districts received in 2010–11, the revised proposal has two important 
features. First, it allocates relatively more additional revenue to districts with high percentages of 
disadvantaged students. Second, for any level of student disadvantage, high school districts receive less 
additional revenue than other districts. The original proposal also shared these two features; the revisions 
have merely lessened the differences in revenue gains among districts. Because of the lower weight for 
disadvantaged students in the revised proposal, districts with high percentages of such students would 
                                                          
 
2 The base rate that equalizes revenue for those two proposals is $7,014 per pupil. The revised proposal would first restore the revenue limit 
deficit factor before fully implementing the new formula. In our simulation, only 36 districts with a total of 16,232 students had undeficited 
revenue limits in excess of their WPF entitlement. We ignored this constraint in our simulation. 
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receive smaller revenue increases in the revised proposal than they received in the original proposal. 
Districts with few disadvantaged students would receive relatively larger increases. Because of the grade-
level weights in the revised proposal, high school districts would receive relatively larger increases in the 
revised proposal than in the original proposal. Their revenue gains are still smaller than for other districts, 
but the revised proposal has reduced the differences. 
Overall, the May revisions to the governor’s proposal have maintained differences in revenue gains among 
districts but reduced their magnitude. This reduction is clearly visible in Table 2. Under the original 
proposal, 39.9 percent of students attended districts with revenue gains between 30 and 50 percent. Under 
the revised proposal, 60.1 percent of students attend such districts.3  
TABLE 2  
The distribution of revenue changes across districts  
 Districts Students Students (%) 
 Original proposal 
Revised 
proposal 
Original 
proposal 
Revised 
proposal 
Original 
proposal 
Revised 
proposal 
less than -10 45 38 61,851 35,793 1.1 0.6 
-10–0  51 48 80,749 81,215 1.4 1.4 
0–10 38 19 143,834 38,677 2.6 0.7 
10–20  64 28 344,654 75,381 6.2 1.3 
20–30 152 114 925,465 430,246 16.5 7.7 
30–40  165 272 1,502,210 1,680,142 26.8 30.0 
40–50  89 142 731,469 1,706,652 13.1 30.5 
50–60  68 109 518,398 830,423 9.3 14.8 
60–70  58 90 419,109 564,910 7.5 10.1 
70–80  56 21 393,665 160,321 7.0 2.9 
80–90  48 0 233,660 0 4.2 0 
90–100 40 0 206,356 0 3.7 0 
100–110 7 0 42,338 0 0.8 0 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on PPIC School Finance Model. 
In reporting our simulation results, we have focused on average gains by district type and by level of student 
disadvantage. In “School District Revenue Changes under Governor Brown’s May Proposal,” a spreadsheet 
available on the PPIC website, we report gains for individual districts. Revenue gains may differ for districts 
of similar characteristics because they received different revenue per pupil under the current system. 
Similarly, under the governor’s revised proposal, revenue per pupil can differ for similar districts because of 
the revenue add-ons. For both TIIBG and HST, revenue per pupil is not evenly distributed across districts. 
These differences are rooted in the complex history of California’s school finance system and are not 
apparent in the averages reported in Table 1. However, they are apparent in the spreadsheet.  
 
 
                                                          
 
3 Of the 86 districts receiving less revenue under the revised proposal than in the status quo, 59 are basic aid districts, which are districts with 
more property tax revenue that their entitlement. Under the WPF program, these districts would continue to have their own property tax 
revenue but they would lose categorical revenue. 
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Conclusion 
The revisions to the governor’s proposal have reduced differences among districts in how new revenue 
would be allocated. In the original proposal, high school districts received relatively smaller increases in 
revenue than other districts. The grade-level weights in the new proposal have lowered that difference. For  
a given level of student disadvantage, under the new proposal high school districts would receive similar 
revenue increases as other districts receive. The revised proposal also distributes additional revenue more 
evenly among districts of the same type. The original proposal channeled proportionally more revenue to 
districts with high percentages of disadvantaged students. This is still true with the revised proposal, but the 
differences are smaller among districts with different levels of student disadvantage. 
 
 
  
 http://www.ppic.org/main/home.asp Funding Formulas for California Schools IV  9 
About the Authors  
Heather Rose is an adjunct policy fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) and an associate 
professor at the School of Education at the University of California, Davis. She specializes in the economics 
of education and school finance. Her recent projects include a study of affirmative action policies at the 
college level and an investigation of how high school curriculum affects the test score gap between white 
and minority students. She has also studied the effects of high-school curriculum on students’ subsequent 
earnings. She holds a B.A. in economics from the University of California, Berkeley, and an M.A. and Ph.D. 
in economics from the University of California, San Diego. 
Jon Sonstelie is an adjunct policy fellow at PPIC and professor of economics at the University of California, 
Santa Barbara. His research interests include several areas in public finance and urban economics, including 
the effect of public school quality on private school enrollment, the incidence of the property tax, the demand 
for public school spending, the economics of rationing by waiting, and the effect of transportation innovations 
on residential locations. He was previously a research fellow at Resources for the Future. He holds a B.A. 
from Washington State University and a Ph.D. from Northwestern University.  
Margaret Weston is a policy associate at PPIC’s Sacramento Center, where her work focuses on K–12 school 
finance. Before joining PPIC, she taught high school English and drama in the Baltimore City Public Schools 
through Teach For America. She holds an M.A in teaching from Johns Hopkins University and an M.A. in 
public policy from the University of Michigan.  
Acknowledgments 
We thank Carol Bingham and Heather Carlson from the California Department of Education for providing 
much of the data used in the simulation model. We thank our advisory group, consisting of Carol Bingham 
and Elizabeth Dearstyne from the Department of Education, Chris Ferguson and Nicolas Schweizer from the 
Department of Finance, and Edgar Cabral and Rachel Ehlers from the Legislative Analyst’s Office, for their 
advice and recommendations as we developed and refined the model for 2010–11. 
 
  
PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA 
Board of Directors 
Gary K. Hart, Chair 
Former State Senator and  
Secretary of Education 
State of California 
Mark Baldassare 
President and CEO 
Public Policy Institute of California 
Ruben Barrales 
President and CEO 
San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce 
María Blanco 
Vice President, Civic Engagement 
California Community Foundation 
Brigitte Bren 
Chief Executive Officer 
International Strategic Planning, Inc. 
Robert M. Hertzberg 
Partner 
Mayer Brown, LLP 
Walter B. Hewlett 
Chair, Board of Directors 
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation 
Donna Lucas 
Chief Executive Officer 
Lucas Public Affairs 
David Mas Masumoto 
Author and Farmer 
Steven A. Merksamer 
Senior Partner 
Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello,  
Gross & Leoni, LLP 
Kim Polese 
Chairman 
ClearStreet, Inc. 
Thomas C. Sutton 
Retired Chairman and CEO 
Pacific Life Insurance Company 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The Public Policy Institute of California is dedicated to informing and improving public policy in California through 
independent, objective, nonpartisan research on major economic, social, and political issues. The institute’s goal 
is to raise public awareness and to give elected representatives and other decisionmakers a more informed basis 
for developing policies and programs. 
The institute’s research focuses on the underlying forces shaping California’s future, cutting across a wide range 
of public policy concerns, including economic development, education, environment and resources, governance, 
population, public finance, and social and health policy. 
PPIC is a private operating foundation. It does not take or support positions on any ballot measures or on any 
local, state, or federal legislation, nor does it endorse, support, or oppose any political parties or candidates for 
public office. PPIC was established in 1994 with an endowment from William R. Hewlett. 
Mark Baldassare is President and Chief Executive Officer of PPIC. 
Gary K. Hart is Chair of the Board of Directors.  
 
 
Short sections of text, not to exceed three paragraphs, may be quoted without written permission provided that 
full attribution is given to the source. 
Research publications reflect the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, 
officers, or Board of Directors of the Public Policy Institute of California. 
 
Copyright © 2012 Public Policy Institute of California 
All rights reserved. 
San Francisco, CA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA 
500 Washington Street, Suite 600  
San Francisco, California 94111 
phone: 415.291.4400     
fax: 415.291.4401 
www.ppic.org     
PPIC SACRAMENTO CENTER 
Senator Office Building 
1121 L Street, Suite 801 
Sacramento, California 95814 
phone: 916.440.1120 
fax: 916.440.1121 
